This paper explores the mismatch between the widely held public policy view of the long-term risk profile for carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) storage with the emerging science and engineering of CO 2 storage. We review the key issues of fit, interplay, and scalability associated with a trust fund funded by a hypothetical $1/tonCO 2 tipping fee for each ton of CO 2 stored in the United States under WRE450 and WRE550 climate policies. Left to grow unchecked, this hypothetical tipping fee fund would accumulate hundreds of billions to trillions of dollars before it would be expected to pay out claims caused by potential damage arising from CO 2 storage. The authors conclude there is no intrinsic value in creating a trust fund predicated solely on collecting a tipping fee. Rather than mitigating the financial consequences of long-term CCS risks, this analysis suggests a blanket $1/tonCO 2 tipping fee may increase the probability and frequency of long-term risk by eliminating financial incentives for sound operating behavior and site selection criteria -contribute to moral hazard. At a minimum, effective use of a trust fund requires: (1) strong oversight regarding site selection and fund management, and (2) a clear process by which the fund is periodically valued and funds collected are mapped to the risk profile of the pool of covered CCS sites. Without appropriate checks and balances, there is no a priori reason to believe that the amount of funds held in trust will map to the actual amount of funds needed to address long-term care expenses and delimited compensatory damages.
Introduction
There is emerging consensus that existing regulatory structures, legal remedies, and financial assurance mechanisms offer a template to create a risk management framework that addresses potential issues arising from carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) injection during the period of principal operations, from capture through closure and a defined period of post-closure, i.e., plugging and abandonment of CO 2 injection wells and their associated CO 2 storage fields. However, considerable concern remains with respect to potential compensatory and other damages that might occur many decades to centuries after CO 2 injection has ceased, which presents the questions, "Who should bear financial responsibility for paying claimants when damages occur?" And if payment results from a public fund, "how should the fund be financed, in what amounts, and by whom?" To demystify the many intertwined issues underpinning discussions about long-term liability risk management and financial responsibility associated with geologic CO 2 storage, this paper explores the concept of a trust fund financed through a per ton of stored CO 2 fee. The concept of a fee-based trust fund for carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) is not new and in fact has been put forward in a number of different forums (see for example, IOGCC 2007 [1] and Rubin et. al. 2007 [2] ) but the ramifications of such a program playing out over the course of this century across something the size of the U.S. economy and without appropriately designed checks and balances have not been adequately addressed.
Specifically, this paper examines how a pay-as-you-go trust fund, financed by an industry-wide $1/tonCO 2 for all CO 2 stored in deep geologic formations within the United States, would work under two hypothetical climate policies. The paper discusses the implications of such a fund including the importance of structured, periodic fund valuation and strong site design and operating criteria to avoid the manifestation of potentially greater long-term risk from adverse site selection due to moral hazard; that is, by virtue of paying first dollar there is the possibility that the CCS developer will be indifferent to subsequent financial consequences and therefore will not try to prevent or mitigate certain losses. The paper concludes with a discussion of how near-and long-term permitting and financial assurance mechanisms can be structured to encourage good site design and selection and strong operational CO 2 injection and reservoir maintenance practices.
U.S. CCS Adoption Under WRE450 and WRE550 Climate Policies
To model the potential commercial adoption of CCS technologies within the United States, and thereby analyze the performance of this hypothetical $1/tonCO 2 tipping fee trust fund, the authors rely upon previously published work that looks at CCS deployment in response to the implementation of so called WRE450 and WRE550 climate policies [3] . Since their original publication in Nature, these WRE pathways have become widely used benchmarks of what will be required to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases in an economically efficient manner [4] . The WRE450 and WRE550 climate policies also are useful for the present analysis of a hypothetical trust fund, because these policies bound much of the climate proposals actively being considered in the U.S. Congress [5] and can shed light on the potential scale of CCS deployment within the United States.
In modelling both the WRE450 and WRE550 climate policies, we assume that the nation draws upon a broad portfolio of greenhouse gas abatement options. For example, in the WRE450 scenario nuclear power doubles within two decades of the enactment of the policy, and renewable energy grows six fold by the middle of this century. In the less stringent WRE550 scenario, nuclear generation doubles and renewable energy quadruples by mid-century. Substantial gains in energy efficiency across the entire economy are also presumed to continue throughout the century. Even with significant growth in these other greenhouse gas abatement energy systems, there is substantial commercial deployment of CCS systems in the U.S. economy. By 2050, the U.S. economy could potentially sequester 19 GtCO 2 in the WRE550 scenario and 54 GtCO 2 in the WRE450 scenario [3] . Figure 1 shows the increasing CO 2 permit prices and the resulting adoption of CCS within the United States.
Examining the Trust Fund in Practice
We use the results from Figure 1 to examine the practical application of a trust fund designed to deal with the potential long-term impacts associated with post-closure leakage of CO 2 from commercial-scale CCS facilities. To finance the fund, we assume regulators assess a tipping fee of $1 for each ton of stored CO 2 in the United States, with payment made at the time the CO 2 is injected into a deep geologic structure that has been permitted in accord with all applicable rules and regulations. A conservative inflation rate of 2% per year is assumed and applied to inflate future deposits to the trust fund to ensure that all users of CCS over the course of this century are paying the same real, inflation-adjusted amount into the fund. We also assume that the funds amassed by the trust fund are earmarked solely for addressing leakage issues that arise after official closure of a CO 2 storage field -after the CCS developer has been released from its site obligations. 3 While not yet final, and therefore still subject to change, the draft U.S. Environmental Protection agency (EPA) Class VI Underground Injection Control (UIC) storage regulation envisions CO 2 injection permits potentially being valid for 50 years -the CCS owner or operator would remain financially responsible for environmental risks manifesting during the injection period, closure period and for as many as 50 years of postclosure monitoring [6] . The time horizon contemplated by EPA's proposed regulation indicates that there will be many decades from the time when payments are made into the trust fund to the earliest possible date when funds could be used to pay for viable long-term care expenses. This significant time lag suggests that society would seek to invest the money in the fund to protect the purchasing power of the deposits. For purposes of illustration, we assume a conservative rate of return of 3% per year. 4 Figure 2 shows the cumulative value of the trust fund over the course of this century for the WRE450 and WRE550 climate policies. Within a few decades of the start of this policy, and if left to grow unchecked, the trust fund has the potential to collect billions of dollars per year, and by mid-century could very well collect tens of billions of dollars from commercial CCS facilities annually. By the end of this century, based on the above-listed assumptions, the balance of funds held in trust likely would be between $3.2 trillion and $2.5 trillion for the WRE450 and WRE550 cases, respectively. If left to grow unchecked, the amount held in this hypothetical trust fund by the end of the century is larger than the current national gross domestic products of all but the five largest economies on the planet [7] . In the WRE450 case, the first hundred CCS facilities, each injecting 5MtCO 2 per year, would be up and running in the United States around 2025. 5 Assuming that these facilities operate for 40 years, the first hundred CCS facilities would reach the end of their productive physical lives around 2065 and would be plugged and abandoned according to their injection permits. For the less stringent WRE550 scenario, the first hundred 5MtCO 2 /year facilities would be operational just before mid-century, and these facilities would be plugged and abandoned by the late 2080s. Because the trust fund is assumed to exist solely for the purpose of financing potential long-term care expenses as well as compensatory and other damages associated with CO 2 leakage after plugging and abandonment, these facilities would be the first capable of drawing on the balance of funds. Under the WRE450 scenario, $300 billion would be available to remediate issues at these 100 sites by 2065. In the WRE550 case, by the time these 100 facilities reach the end of their useful lives, there would be nearly $1.5 trillion set aside. Further, the proposed EPA Class VI rule envisions a period of up to 50 years of post-closure responsibility for the owner or operator. As such, the date at which these first CCS facilities could access the wealth stored in this trust fund could be sometime in the early part of the 22 nd century potentially resulting in an inefficient use of economic resources in the near term.
The Need to Tailor Solutions: The Issues of Fit, Interplay, and Scalability 6
An important challenge in designing a rational financial risk management framework for CCS will be to resolve issues of fit, interplay, and scalability. 7 Specifically, in evaluating financial risk management solutions for CCS, one must consider the fit between the properties of the physical system and the attributes of the institutions charged with regulating or managing risk, the interplay between and among existing laws, new laws and partnering 5 There is no reason to believe, and in fact there are many reasons to argue against the idea, that there would be 100 identical CO 2 storage projects fielded that all stored exactly 5 MtCO 2 /year. There will undoubtedly be smaller facilities as well as larger ones built during this time. The assumption of there being one hundred 5 MtCO 2 /year CO 2 storage sites is only meant to be a simplifying assumption to allow for a clearer focus on the temporal aspect of this hypothetical trust fund. 6 For a more detailed discussion of the liability risk management and financial responsibility concepts summarized in this paper, see also: Chiara nsequences.
institutions, and the challenges created by the volume and scale of eventual CO 2 deposits including the range and magnitude of potential risks as well as potential co
The handful of integrated assessment studies completed to date examining the potential consequences associated with less than 100% retention of stored CO 2 typically assume that a fixed rate of leakage (e.g., 0.1% or 0.01% of cumulative stored CO 2 per year) will occur across all reservoirs and across all time (see for example, Dooley and Wise 2003 [8] , Hepple and Benson 2003 [9] ). While simplifying assumptions are crucial aspects of modeling any real world system, this particular assumption has profoundly impacted public discourse about the large-scale commercial deployment of CCS. By assuming that a fixed quantity of the cumulative CO 2 stored eventually leaks, the modeler implies that eventually all of the CO 2 will leak from the containment zone. However, as noted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [10] , there is no basis for this assumption, and there are multiple lines of evidence to suggest that this simply cannot be true (e.g., the existence of CO 2 in natural domes that are hundreds of millions of years old). Further, such a simplistic approach defies our collective experience with respect to engineered and natural systems. On rare occasions, these systems experience catastrophic failure, and on other occasions, which can occur with low to modest frequency assuming proper design and use, these systems experience failures of small to modest magnitude. The associated natural and engineered systems rarely, if ever, fail at a uniform and constant rate, absent systemic design failure. By their very nature, models create artificial simulations of a mythical "average" site for purposes of simplification and to create and manage pools -in reality, no "average" site exists.
By failing to understand the critical importance and fundamental limitations of such modeling assumptions, many are led to believe that CO 2 storage sites are all the same, and CO 2 storage is bound to create a continually growing potential risk to future generations. It is the belief that the scale of the potential problem associated with CO 2 storage must grow with time, and grow at an exponential rate, that underlies calls for blanket indemnification or a polluter-pays trust fund predicated on a fee-based structure (that also grows without limits). However, as Benson [11] , IPCC [10] and the International Energy Agency Greenhouse Gas R&D Program [12] ) all have noted, the principal trapping mechanisms should increase storage integrity over time. Figure 3 (taken from Benson [11] ), shows that it is during the period of active injection, which would be regulated by the UIC CO 2 storage/permit, that the risk of leakage is likely to be highest. Once injection stops, pressure in the field should begin to subside, and solubility, capillary trapping, and mineralization should be locking the injected CO 2 in place making leakage less likely with each passing year. However, even if sites are properly selected, designed, and managed, the potential for a low-frequency, catastrophic event remains, and a responsible financial risk management system should be created to manage such risks in the long term.
Conclusions
Using WRE450 and WRE550 atmospheric stabilization pathways to bound the stringency of likely U.S. climate policies, it becomes clear that a simplistic fund predicated on unlimited fee-based contributions certainly is capable of amassing tens of billions of dollars by the time these funds might be drawn upon, and potentially trillions of dollars by the end of the century. This hypothetical trust fund concept sheds light on fundamental issues that often receive too little attention in discussions of how to address long-term liability such as:
Time profile -when consequences and associated damages are likely to occur; Frequency profile -how often such events are expected to occur; and Severity characteristics -the magnitude of damages; that is, the age-old question of "how bad can it get?" First, it is critically important to acknowledge that "no existing studies systematically estimate the probability and magnitude of [stored CO 2 ] release across a sample of credible geological storage systems" [10] . The lack of useful data to predict the frequency, severity, and probability of CO 2 leakage as well as the absence of useful data to allow policymakers and insurers to estimate what damages might occur, what remediation options might exist, and the cost and effectiveness of employing those remediation measures exacerbate problems of fit, interplay, and/or scalability.
Given these key knowledge gaps, the first priority of any scheme designed to address long-term liability should be to encourage good site selection and operational practices that reduce the likelihood of problems arising in the future. CCS-related risks present a unique set of consequences whereby neither traditional public nor traditional private, nor a blend of traditional public and private risk management structures, offer the perfect model for mitigating and managing CCS risks. In truth, no two sites will ever be the same in terms of their geology or in terms of how their storage fields are managed in practice. In fact, site-specific geologic attributes (e.g., cap rock characteristics, mineral make-up, natural and artificial faults, fractures, abandoned wells tectonic activity, etc.) will affect whether, when, and the degree to which CO 2 leakage will manifest. Some of these characteristics may change over time, and the risks associated with each component risk may increase, decrease or remain static over time. Therefore, it is essential that an integrated, effective financial responsibility program evolve that will provide a menu of financial instruments to CCS developers that ensures funds are adequate (if and when needed) and ensures that funds are readily accessible to pay for site closure, post-closure, and corrective activities, both now and in the future. Further, it will respond to the changing nature of the subject facility's operations and in a manner consistent with the physical reality and evolution of risks over time [13] . In the context of CCS, different risks are likely to be present at different stages during the facility's life-cycle resulting in a range of consequences the financial materiality of which will depend on the site-specific characteristics and location of each CCS project. For these reasons, the design and application of financial risk management mechanisms for CCS must balance incentives that foster early deployment with the potential for adverse selection due to moral hazard, particularly as commercial-scale deployment evolves.
The eventual financial risk management framework for CCS must align to the project lifecycle, whereby the CCS facility remains financially responsible for consequences arising during the operational phase from capture through post-closure. The operator should be required to demonstrate the ability to manage risks, both technically and financially, using well tested first-party assurances based on financial capacity (self-insurance) or third-party mechanisms. In general, these financial mechanisms are well suited to manage risks that present themselves when the CCS facility is active and best able to leverage funds (cash flow) to finance the mechanisms. The multiple (single goal) components of these traditional financial mechanisms address the near-term need for financial assurance and offer CCS operators flexibility in managing their risk portfolio. In addition, the costs associated with closure, post-closure, and foreseeable corrective action tend to be reasonably estimable on an annual basis and therefore quantifiable during the operational phase.
obligations. However, unless contributions to the trust map to the expected value of expenses/damages likely to be incurred over the long term, there is little financial assurance that the balance of funds residing in the trust will be appropriate to the long-term need for funds. In addition, arbitrary limits on liability that do not map to the evolution of the risk profile of CCS sites -from early movers to commercial-scale deployment -can result in inadequate coverage and substantial financial exposure to the institutions backstopping claims made against the program. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, is the issue of moral hazard: Does a Trust of this type and structure inherently discourage site developers from taking certain risk management actions by virtue of paying first dollar for relief? Referring back to Figure 1 , showing carbon permit prices are escalating quickly and reaching hundreds of dollars per ton CO 2 by the end of the century, the question becomes whether a $1/tonCO 2 tipping fee provides substantial incentive to encourage good CO 2 storage practices or whether, once paid, the relatively minor fee is assumed to absolve CO 2 storage operators of future liability, and therefore inappropriately incents poor behavior with unintended consequential impacts by sending a zero dollar price signal to CCS developers. If it is the latter, then blanket indemnification for injected CO 2 needs to be carefully considered in terms of whether or not it creates appropriate incentives for good CO 2 storage reservoir management.
For these reasons, to the degree enabling legislation establishes a trust to underpin the long-term financial risk management framework for CCS, the trust must be:
(1) Mandated between a maximum and minimum financial threshold that appropriately integrates the expected value of financial consequences that may arise from CCS sites, such that fee collection is suspended when the trust reaches the maximum dollar threshold and resumes when accumulation falls below the prescribed minimum threshold;
(2) Representative of the expected value of expenses and delimited compensatory damages likely to be incurred;
(3) Re-evaluated and "trued-up" based on a clearly defined risk profile developed from actual site-specific monitoring data no less than every three years; and (4) Managed by an independent, third-party entity vested with the authority to render "go" or 'no-go" decisions with respect to suspending or closing poorly performing or excessively risk sites.
A revolving trust fund may be most appropriate to address the range of potential consequences arising from CCS deployment. The success of this type of long-term framework, however, is predicated on the degree to which it integrates the above-listed criteria. In so doing, we are assured of incentivizing the lowest risk deployment of CCS technology in a manner that appropriately balances economic efficiency and protection of our natural resources.
